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Theme I: Economy, Prosperity,
and Social Justice
AN ARGUMENT FOR ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION
Leopold Specht*
In thispresentation I shall describe (i) aprocessof expanding the institutional frame-
works of economic and social development that apply on a global scale principles
found in the Anglo-American world; (ii) the reinterpretation of these institutional
frameworks by ascribing to them a narrow – to a certain extent ideological – mean-
ing which does not reﬂect the variety of meanings carried by those institutions in
the Anglo-Americanworld; and (iii) the undermining of sovereign decision-making
by states in order to regulate economies and social systems in amanner that doesnot
pose limitations to the expansion of the institutional framework as described above.
This hegemonic programmeof ‘globalization’ is at the heart of policies promoted by
the United States and such international institutions as the InternationalMonetary
Fund (IMF) and theWorld Bank.
Here, I intend to focuson the limitationson state sovereignty, andmake somesug-
gestions concerning the institutional pillars to support an alternativeprogrammeof
globalization. To advancemy argument, it will be necessary to provide a description
of the course along which the hegemonic programme of globalization is currently
being achieved.
1 The understanding of economic and social development encapsulated in the
hegemonic programme is crystallized around an image of markets which func-
tion according to a generalization of certain US experiences. Such an under-
standing implies a hierarchy of markets, with capital markets at the top and
labour markets at the bottom. This view of markets focuses on a repertoire of
instruments developed to facilitate market transactions in the Anglo-American
context. In translating this image of markets and speciﬁc instruments of trans-
actions into a programme operating on a global scale, economies are being
reorganized according to a blueprint which aims at changing the system of
decision-making in enterprises – through corporatization and privatization –
and at imposing so-called hard budget constraints upon enterprises by strictly
limiting the aggregate quantity of money available in a particular national
economy.
2 The politics generated by this programme are anchored in a perception of its
substance which is narrow in two ways. The hegemonic programme suggests a
particular version of monetarist laissez-faire as inherent in its institutional pro-
gramme, and also that this monetarist laissez-faire would be prevailing, gener-
ally, inAnglo-American economies (andnot only during certainperiods). And the
* Lawyer, Visiting Professor, Sapientia University, Rome.
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potential of using themechanisms evolving from the institutions, thehegemonic
programme argues, is only limited to a monetarist and laissez-faire programme
of economic policies.
Thealternativeviewunderlying theproposal advanced in thispaper suggests that
the institutional arrangements around which markets are being structured result
in an (often) ‘unruly pluralism’ of apparently conﬂicting policies and, thus, in a
multitudeof contents and formsof such institutional arrangements. The alternative
view furthermore argues that these institutional arrangements are capable of taking
onmany different and potentially indeterminate meanings.
The hegemonic programme of globalization advances its agenda by circumscrib-
ing the regulatory powers of states and of entities with legislative powers, such as
the European Union.
These limitations usually operate on two levels. First, international institutions
make their monetary support for states conditional, in most cases, on the imple-
mentation of policies which conform with the hegemonic programme. Second,
global ﬁrms are ascribed rights which amount, in many circumstances, to (quasi)
sovereignty. This ‘normal’ course of expanding the hegemonic programme of glob-
alization owes its being to the power constellations in existence after the end of the
Cold War. The cause of the demise of the Soviet bloc is interpreted as being attrib-
uted to the supremacy of a ‘Western’ system which is reduced – in its prevailing
descriptions – to the ideological (mis-)representation of Anglo-American economic
and social systems described above.
Furthermore, and increasingly often, the weight of US military power is used to
support the hegemonic agenda. In doing so, the United States exploits its ability to
impose a state of emergency on states and societies in any part of theworldwithout
having to contend with another sovereign power or being checked by the United
Nations.
Most descriptions of the hegemonic programme of globalization note the limita-
tions posed on state sovereignty. Accordingly, in a quasi-natural process, the power
of states to regulate the economy and to intervene in the social arena is constantly
being weakened. The curtailment of the powers traditionally perceived as falling
within sovereignty (of states) are argued to be amain reason for the advancement of
the hegemonic programme.
I suggest that theweakening of sovereignty is only one component to note when
analyzing the impact of globalization on state sovereignty. Of similar importance,
it seems to me, is a broadening of the concept of sovereignty; that is, the institu-
tional framework of the hegemonic programme of globalization is transforming
or redeﬁning the concept of sovereignty as intended by the United States and its
allies (the so-called ‘international community’). Stateswhich donot subscribe to the
hegemonic programme are viewed as a threat to the sovereignty of the members of
this ‘international community’.
Let me refer – as an example – to the so-called ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and
Self-GovernmentinKosovo’thatcontainedthemandatetointroducea ‘Westernstyle
market economy’ in Yugoslavia. Initially, the relationship between the economic
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programme and the dilution of sovereignty was camouﬂaged. It was obfuscated by
a human rights discourse (Kosovo). Lately, this connection has increasingly been
unveiled.
The prevailing view is that social systems that deviate from those promulgated
by the hegemonic programme of globalization are perceived as a mounting threat
to the members of a so-called ‘international community’ and to the international
community itself. A particular economic and social order becomes a salient element
affecting the sovereigntyof states.And thedrive for the impositionof suchorderona
global scale is viewedaspart of the expansionof the sovereigntyof the ‘international
community’.
This devolution transforming the hegemonic programme of globalization into a
deﬁning element of the sovereignty of certain states is noteworthybecause it reveals
the invisible hands which are busy crafting a new world order that reﬂects the
inherent values of the hegemonic programme of globalization. In recognizing this
shift in paradigm, the expansion of particular institutional arrangements ceases to
be a quasi-natural phenomenon. To argue in favour of alternatives is, hence, not an
exercise in futility.
Also, alternative social and political programmes ﬁnd some cogency in the in-
stitutional arena if elevated to the level of reasoning about sovereignty. That is: if
economic and social orders becomegenerally recognized as deﬁning elements in the
exerciseof sovereignty, interventionsbystatesor international institutions in favour
of one particular economic (social) order – against other ones –would be recognized
as a violation of the sovereignty of the non-conforming state. In view of public
international law currently in force, this statement seems to summarize prevailing
wisdom. An analysis of the so-called IMF orWorld Bank conditionalities that a state
must implementorundertake inorder to implementwithin itsnational economyas
a conditionof anyﬁnancial support (soft andhard loans, or grants) demonstrates the
hegemonic programme (of globalization) abandoning the precepts of international
law; which is even more apparent in the light of the unbridled, ofﬁcial rhetoric of
the remaining superpower.
An alternative programme of globalization may use the traditional panoply
of concepts found in the body of public international law as an instrument
for arguing in favour of decisional and regulatory powers on the level of states
and intergovernmental organizations (such as the EU). The reference to public
international law requires, however, a review of its underlying institutional and
doctrinal precepts. In this respect, I shall limit myself for the purposes of this
presentation to referring, for example, to David Kennedy’s account of the perpetual
reproposition of the narrative on (state) power with continuously changing gram-
mar andunaltered content. Theprimarypositioningof doctrinal accounts described
inhis analysis – fromthemoveof the secular to institutions, and from institutions to
procedure – reconstitute previous dilemmas throughout the following stage of the
narrative of international law. Kennedy’s analysis of the shift within international
law doctrine provides for sufﬁcient instrumentation critically to view the institu-
tional programmes proposed by the hegemony programme and also the alternative
set forth below.
852 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
The alternative view on globalization, as proposed here, relies on and broadens
the concept of ‘functional antagonism’ emerging from Nathaniel Berman’s review
of the notion of ‘neutrality’ in his account of the concepts of international law that
dominated the debate during the period of the SpanishCivilWar (1936–39). Berman
describes a ‘functional agnosticism’ towards competing claims to sovereignty as a
sophisticated doctrinal turn in themeaning of neutrality aimed at upholdingworld
peace along the lines established by the League of Nations.
I shall borrow this concept of functional agnosticism to allude to an institutional
framework for competing tenets of social development on a global scale.
To institutionalize competition and pluralism of programmes of social develop-
ment on the largest possible scale is the core of the alternative programme. This
programme suggests that the world needs to re-examine socially sustainable devel-
opment encapsulated in the BrettonWoods system. It envisions institutional arenas
providing for the amalgamation of competing visions of social and economic de-
velopment and an unbiased allocation of resources for experimentation with such
competing visions.
Let me brieﬂy speak about the contents of the alternative programme and af-
terwards allude to the institutional framework within which to promote this
alternative.
Social institutions as developed in the Anglo-American world and in the rich
societiesof thenorthAtlanticbasinarepotentially indeterminate as to theirpurpose
and function. They assume particular meanings and take on such forms as are
required by regulatory tasks in speciﬁc circumstances. The abstractions of a variety
of meanings of institutional arrangements into the prevailing ones are therefore
context-bound. The narratives on the development of social institutions are inmost
cases nothing but an ex post facto legitimization which justiﬁes such developments.
By way of example, let me refer to property rights. Robert Gordon’s work on early
modern concepts of property in the United States draws an instructive picture of
the genesis of property rights as not being linear. He describes an extensive number
of institutions with contradictory purposes, and, in many cases, the prevailing
exceptions to the doctrines which are described as the origin of contemporary
concepts of property rights.
The same can be claimed for other social institutions, in any given time and for
all ‘intern’ societies. The design of a blueprint for social development on the basis of
generalizations or even with reference to a given set of institutions in a particular
society is, at best, an inaccurate description of such a society.
To solicit an ‘unruly pluralism’ (Robert Gordon) of meanings and forms of social
development is the task of alternative globalization. This pluralism might encom-
pass conﬂicting understandings ofWestern institutions. And it should extend over
social institutions in societies which are notWestern in terms of their genesis.
Themost important aspirationof a programmeaiming at soliciting thepluralism
of form and content inherent in any given society is the trust in the process of
continuous experimentation and the understanding that social problems are never
resolved but are in a state of permanent ‘resolution’. And, notably, it is built upon
the trust in the ability of people to act in inspired ways.
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The hegemonic view of globalization is supported by international institutions
which promote ‘globalization’ of the kind described in the ﬁrst part of my present-
ation. An institutional framework for the alternative programme of globalization
must be ‘functionally agnostic’ with respect to the particular features of varying
social and economic programmes (policies). It should allow for the promotion of
different and distinctive programmes and for a continuous assessment of each pro-
gramme. Crucially, an institutional framework developed as part of such alternative
must be agnostic with respect to the particular institutions which constitute the
framework itself.
A traditional understanding of sovereignty, conceptually enriched by the no-
tion of ‘functional antagonism’, helps us to rethink the ‘state’ as one (of various)
institutional framework(s) for promoting alternative models of globalization.
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF TRAFFICKING, MIGRATION AND
TERRORISM: THE IMPACT ON CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS AND
WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Ratna Kapur*
I raise three issues for discussion. Theﬁrst issue is theway inwhich global economic
processes have triggered a contemporary wave of migration, legal and illegal, and
the international and domestic responses to this phenomenon. Second is the gender
impact of anti-trafﬁcking initiatives in the domestic and international arena, which
haveadverselyaffectedwomen’seconomicchoices, curtailedtheir rights tomobility,
and produced a clandestine migrant-mobility regime. The third issue is the way in
which recent legal responses to cross-border movements have been informed by
the ‘war on terror’ and have converged with the discourse of the conservative right,
building on xenophobia predating the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11
September 2001 to produce hostility towards, and fear of, the ‘other’, who seems to
threaten the security of the nation.
The political and legal agenda that is currently being pursued in relation to
cross-border movements is diametrically opposed to women’s rights and to the
rights of others who cross borders as migrants, refugees, or asylum-seekers. The
contemporary legal interventions in the lives of the transnational ‘subordinate
subject’ are being articulated primarily from the perspective of the host country and
within the overarching concern for the security of the nation.
Nearly 150millionmigrants cross borders in our world today – from rural towns
to urban centres, from the periphery to themetropolis, from the global south to the
global north. Evicted from their homelands by powerful forces of exclusion and dis-
advantage, a growingmass of ﬂoatingmigrants is squatting on global borderlands –
searching for a new home, waiting to arrive. The residents of the global borderlands
are non-nationals, non-citizens, and practically non-existent to those who reside in
and manage the business and defence of homelands. This new breed of migrants is
* Director, Centre for Feminist Legal Research, New Delhi; Professor of International Law, CUNY School of
Law; Global Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law.
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gendered.Thesecrossingschallengeourmostbasicnotionsofwomen’s reproductive
labour, family, community, nation, culture, and citizenship.
Globalization is invariably used to refer to the free ﬂow of goods and capital,
thought tobecritical to theefﬁciencyof themarket and intrinsic to theglobalization
process. The market also triggers a global ﬂow of labour, yet the free ﬂow of labour
is not addressed within the discourse of market management. It is addressed by
initiatives dealing with trafﬁcking, human smuggling, border controls, terrorism,
and sexual morality.
Countries of origin and destination gain from migration, including clandestine
migration. In the context of globalization, migrations do not just happen – they
are produced. They are partly an outcome of the actions of governments’ foreign
policies and their economic involvement in migrants’ countries of origin. Earlier
colonial patterns also inform current migration patterns, captured in the slogan,
‘We are here, because you were there’. In countries of destination, the demand for
an abundant supply of low-wage labour and a shrinking supply of a local workforce
sustains the economy of the global metropolises and produces migration. At the
same time, cash remittances to countries of origin have registered phenomenal in-
creasesoverrecentyears,oftensustaininghousehold,community, local,andnational
economies.
At the international level, cross-border movements have been addressed as ‘traf-
ﬁcking’ and ‘smuggling’. This approach has had a particularly adverse impact on
women, pushing them further into situations of violence and exploitation. At the
domestic level, these movements have been addressed through appeals to assimila-
tion and tests of fealty to the nation, as well as the criminal law and the ‘othering’
of the ‘alien migrant’, who fails to assimilate and continues to enter countries by
illegal means.
While theavenues for regular, legal, andsafemigrationhavedecreasedworldwide
due to the restrictive migration and immigration policies of countries of transit
and destination, this phenomenon has actually produced a growing market for
clandestinemigration services under themigrant-mobility regime. Irregular labour
services, smuggling, facilitation of illegal migration, provision of false passports
and visa permits, underground travel operations, trafﬁcking, and other clandestine
migration services are not an aberration or ‘rogue’ regime. They are produced by the
legal order erected to address cross-border movements.
Half of nearly all migrants are women and girls, andmany of these aremigrating
independently rather than as part of a family. Women’s cross-border movements
continue to be addressed primarily through anti-trafﬁcking initiatives at the inter-
national, regional, and domestic level. Under these initiatives, a woman’s consent is
irrelevant and her subjectivity denied. She is addressed primarily as a victim, to be
rescued, rehabilitated and repatriated. At times her consent is acknowledged only to
implicateher in the discourses of immorality (for suchmigration is consistently and
erroneously conﬂatedwith sexwork) and criminality, to be penalized togetherwith
trafﬁckers and terrorists for exposing the porosity of borders and the vulnerability
of the nation-state. These responses do not engage with the premise that migration
is a manifestation of globalization – that it is indeed globalization.
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The movement of women is engendered by factors that render them amenable
to migration and expose them to human rights violations: the insecurity of food
and livelihood, the growing reliance of households on the earnings of women and
girls, the erosion of social capital and the breakdown of traditional societies, the
transnationalization ofwomen’s labour in sectorswhich donot complywith labour
or human rights standards and often rely on exploitative labour, forced labour, and
slavery-like practices. Women’s migration is rendered vulnerable by assumptions
about gender and sexuality: the assumption that women’s primary work is in the
home, underscored by the sexual division of labour. Trafﬁcking regulations, like
border controls relying ondeportationor incarceration, ignore the economic engine
that drives transborder female migration. Instead, women migrants become more
attractive when their status is illegal, and their social and economic options and
demands are constrained.
The choice of women to move in response to these push and pull factors is
not facilitated or protected by international legal mechanisms. Instead, women’s
migration is treated as sex work and trafﬁcking. The trafﬁcking in women and girls
is routinely conﬂated with their sale and forced consignment to brothels in the
sex industry. Equatingmigrationwith trafﬁcking leads to simplistic and unrealistic
solutions focused on preventing those who are deemed vulnerable frommigrating.
This reinforces the gender stereotype that women and girls need constant male or
state protection from harm, and must not be allowed to exercise their own right to
movement or to earn a living in the manner they choose. This logic has resulted
in viewing all consensual migrant females as trafﬁcked. Further, curbingmigration
drives the activity further underground, pushing the victims further into situations
of violence and abuse.
The choice of women to cross borders needs to be viewed within the context of
empowerment and their search for better economic market opportunities. Their
consent must be located in the matrix of the global economy, market demand,
and cross-border migrations. The international legal order should facilitate wo-
men’s freedom of mobility and safe migration, especially, though not exclusively,
from the south to the north. Instead, her consensual movement is rendered illegal,
through the foregrounding of the security of the nation-state, the conservative
sexual morality that informs anti-trafﬁcking laws, and the xenophobic responses
to global movements that increasingly inform immigration laws. These legislative
measures are de facto partners with the parallel ‘underground migrant-mobility
regime’, where travel agents and transporters, complete with route maps, direc-
tions, and a list of the most vulnerable points of entry, negotiate how their hu-
man cargo will cross borders, avoiding apprehension by state agents and border
patrols.
The problems have been made worse by the new global war on terror. We are
witnessing a heightened anxiety about the ‘other’, perceived as a threat to the
security of the nation. The boundary line of difference is being redrawn along very
stark divides – between friend and enemy, those who are good and those who are
evil. The ‘alienmigrant’ has become one of the primary targets and casualties of the
failure to deﬁne either the purpose or limits of the ‘war on terrorism’.
856 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
This newwar has created space for a more strident and alarming response to the
global movements of people. Because the smugglers offer travel services to illegal
migrants, they easily fall within the category of transnational organized crime,
criminals, and potential terrorists. At the very worst they are terrorists and at best
they are criminals who have sought to cross the border illegally. The conﬂation of
the migrant with the terrorist is not new, but it has received greater attention since
11 September.
Thespace for themigrant isbeingerodedthroughthediscoursesof trafﬁckingand
terrorism. Both justify initiatives designed to keep the ‘Rest’ away from the ‘West’.
The security of the alien migrant may be less threatened by people smugglers than
by the international system of protection offered to people who move as migrants,
refugees, or asylum-seekers.
The legal interventions in the lives of the alien migrant have been articulated
primarily from the perspective of the host country. Subordinate voices are omit-
ted from these conversations, yet only these voices can untangle the conﬂations
and confusions between trafﬁcking, migration, and terrorism. The voice of the sub-
ordinate needs to be foregrounded – not as a terrorist, nor as a victim, but as a
complex subject who is affected by global processes, and seeking safe passage across
borders.
The agency ofwomen also needs to be foregrounded. Her choice tomovemust be
distinguished from other situations where her consent is absent or her movement
is compelled by strife or conﬂict. Regardless of why women move, their assertion
of the right to mobility, self-determination, and development must not be confused
with the violence, force, coercion, abuse, or fraud that may take place in the course
ofmigrationor travel. The crime rests in the abuse andviolations committed against
women along the continuum of women’s migration and not because of the move-
ment or mobility per se.
Inorder toaddress the issueof cross-bordermovements,wecannot simply remain
conﬁned to the domestic arena, where regulatory enforcement is focused on the
individual and the border. Nor can this process be addressed in the international
legal arena purely in terms of criminality or trafﬁcking. Transnational movements
require a transnational response and analysis – they cannot be caught within older
frameworks.
We shouldmodify immigration laws to accommodate their transnational reality,
expanding immigration laws that acknowledge and facilitate the entry of people
other than those who are part of the information technology, highly skilled work
force, or economic migrants with a big bank balance.
At the same time, by virtue of her subordinate status, the transnational subject
also brings a normative challenge – to the porosity of national borders and the
emergence of non-state entities as a signiﬁcant force in the international arena. The
liberal state and the liberal subject are based on the idea of ﬁxedborders,with clearly
identiﬁable interests and identities. The complexity of new global formations and
the dynamic character of the individual who crosses borders challenge the notion
that the state and individual are hermetically sealed from one another and breaks
down the binaries – the us and them, here and there distinctions – and enables us to
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recognize how these oppositions are produced and made to seem natural through
historical power relationships.
THE ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Balakrishnan Rajagopal*
My remarks are drawn from work I have done recently on the jurisprudence of
second- and third-generation human rights in international courts and the relation-
ship between globalization, development, and standards (human rights, environ-
mental and labour) in speciﬁc industrial sectors. I criticise the economic ideology of
human rights discourse deployed in the context of globalization. The issue of social
justice is framed as amatter of human rights, Iwant tomakeusmore cautious about
using this frame.
The 1999 US State Department report on human rights identiﬁed human rights
along with money and the Internet as a universal language of globalization. The
implication was clearly that the relationship between rights and economic glob-
alization is positive. Other groups think that the relationship between rights and
globalizationisnegative.Manydevelopingcountries thinkthatglobalizationshould
in fact come ahead of basic human rights, including labour rights. Many non-state
actors and social movements see globalization as undercutting human rights.
The position that rights and globalization are positively correlated rests on an
emasculated and market-friendly concept of human rights that actually does not
include economic, social, and cultural rights. This stripped-down version of human
rights continues to be themainstream view, at least in the United States. Such a hu-
man rights theory would not question any social arrangement that results from the
‘impartial’ operationof themarket, judged to be either, as the economists say, Pareto-
optimal or in conformity with the so called Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle.
Developingstates thatplacedevelopmentbeforehumanrights infactsharetheas-
sumptions of neo-classical economic theory and see globalization andhuman rights
as incompatible.We can see this in the debate over labour rights, even regarding the
labour standards that have been included in the 1998 principles of the International
Labour Organization (ILO). Leading trade economists argue that different labour
standards constitute a source of comparative advantage. These economists recog-
nize that economic competition under the assumptions of neo-classical economic
theory, including insatiable and ever rising consumption or the idea of scarcity,
would lead to losers also. But the ideahere is that as long as the losers could in theory
be compensated, the economic competition is beneﬁcial or efﬁcient. But in reality,
as we all know, in the international legal order particularly, there is no mechanism
for offering any compensation to losers.
In trade, forexample, it is recognized that therewillbe losers,but theway inwhich
it is justiﬁed is according to theKaldor-Hicksprinciple,while international trade law
does not have any mechanism for ensuring compensation. Even at the micro-level
* Assistant Professor of Law and Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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within countries, in the decision to build a dam for example, it is recognized that
there will be losers and it is justiﬁed according to the compensation principle. But
in fact, most of the losers, which include the poorest and most vulnerable, are not
compensated.
But, more importantly, developing states believe that the losers could be taken
care of not through a principle of compensation that is integrated into economic
decision-making throughmarket decisions, but through something external called
development, and not through, for example, legally entrenched economic and social
rights to land, housing, or education. But designating development as the sole way
of taking care of losers reduces the issue of social justice to one of state capacity. It
becomes a question of whether, for example, the Ministry of Urban Development
has the capacity to engage in slum redevelopment to deal with a housing crisis.
So it is a very narrow approach to social justice that emerges from the critique of
developing countries.
The third group– socialmovements andnon-state actors – seemtohave abroader
descriptionof human rights that includes economic, social, and cultural rights relat-
ing to, for example, land, cultural autonomy,housing, or livelihood for survival. This
is true inmovements ranging fromBrazil to India toThailand that I have researched.
And this expanded conception also coincideswith emerging trends in international
human rights law, including emerging practice even by leading non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International and Human RightsWatch, as
well as the UN Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission towards a
more expansive notion of human rights.
Recently there have been some ‘insurgent’ judgements, marginal to the main-
stream, that show a richer, more nuanced understanding of economic, social and
cultural rights. Judge Weeramantry’s concurring opinion in Hungary v. Slovakia
blazes a new trail by re-articulating the legal basis for the principle of sustainable
development in international law to connect the environment, human rights, and
cultural survival. A recent judgement by the South African constitutional court,
Grootboom v. Government of South Africa, involving housing rights, is also very prom-
ising. Suchcases take the ideaof economic, social, and cultural rightsmore seriously.
What do all these judgements show? They show that the equation of social
justice andhumanrights is awork inprogress, grounded in thepolitics of struggleby
social movements. To assure prosperity with social justice, the notion of prosperity
must itself be critically examined and a broader human rights theory should be
formulated that reﬂects how themost vulnerable actually use human rights.
THE DYNAMIC OF INSTITUTIONAL DISCREPANCIES AND GROWING
CONTRADICTION WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
Chantal Thomas*
I want to focus on discrepancies in institutional capacity within the international
legal order, and the growing contradictionwithin the international economic order
* Professor, FordhamUniversity School of Law.
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between a dynamic of liberalization and a dynamic of prohibitionism. Following
on from Professor Rotter’s discussion of lawmaking, and the idea that lawmaking
follows the normative identity of lawmakers, it is important to look into the actual
process of decision-making,wherewecan see the tracesof inequalities that continue
to plague the international legal order. One example is the very severe discrepancies
in institutional capacity between the developed and developing states. So this is not
an ideological or normative issue. It is a very concrete question of who actually gets
to sit around the table andwhohas a level of capacity thatmakes their participation
a valuable one. If one goes to the ofﬁces of theWorld Trade Organization in Geneva,
one discovers that the actual plenary rooms are too small for the 146 states that are
nowWTOmembers, and the reason for that is that only a sub-portionof themember
states actually are able to sit in plenary discussions on an ongoing basis, only a sub-
portion of the fullmembership of theWTO can afford permanent representation in
Geneva and can afford to have even one representative in plenary discussions. This
disables developing states from participating effectively in the process of shaping
international legal norms. This is happening as we speak in the negotiations for
theWorld Trade Organization following Doha. There is a call for an early harvest of
concessions in theWTOon services, on agriculture, andonanumber of other fronts,
and a number of developing governments are pressured to concede without even
having the opportunity to read the documents in their own languages – or without
even having the opportunity to read documents at all. In the wake of the events of
11 September 2001 there is a lot of pressure on developing states to agree to norms
which they have very little ability to participate in generating.
Efforts toaddress theproblemof institutionalcapacityare inadequate.TheWTO’s
technical assistance function brings in people for a couple of weeks for seminars
on very basic elements of trade law, most-favoured-nation principle, and so on, but
does not enable governments to identify what their interests would be in concrete
negotiating situations. We also see a discrepancy in institutional capacity between
the political bodies and the judicial bodies. Within the WTO the judicialization
of international trade law has the effect of constraining the politically negotiated
intentions behind a standard, so that even when there is some recognition of the
importance of development, for example within the negotiations, it often becomes
limited in the process of actually applying the law. For example, in the bananas
case, the European Community was able to negotiate a waiver of Article 1 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to enable the continuation of its
performance scheme for developing nations. In the judicial dispute, the waiver was
read very narrowly, despite the intent.
There is also a signiﬁcant discrepancy in institutional capacity between ‘hard’
law and ‘soft’ law. In the negotiations at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable
Development, for example, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
Japan argued for a hierarchy of norms, whereby theWTOwould trump any attempt
bytheEUorthedevelopingstates tonegotiateanormof, forexample,environmental
conservation or development. Such concrete institutional discrepancies elevate a
very formal and narrow interpretation of trade over and above other competing
concerns.
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The other issue I want to address is the contradiction between the norm of lib-
eration on the one hand and the increase of prohibitionism on the other. It is very
clear that the dynamics of globalization enable both legal trade and illegal trade.
First, improvements in technologyandcommunication that generate thepossibility
of multinational production of cars and sports shoes also enable the multinational
production and creation of heroin, of cocaine, of illegalmigrants, and so on. There is
no economic difference between legal aspects of the economy and illegal aspects of
the economy on this score: they are equally enabled by technological developments
that have generated globalization. Second, as trade agreements have streamlined
the process of international trade in legal sectors, they have also streamlined trade
in illegal sectors. Smuggling of illegal products such as narcotics or illegal migrants
in containers that are themselves legally crossing borders as the result of trade lib-
eralization is easier. Globalization also produces illegal trade. Agricultural imports
displace domestic production. Clearly one result of generating a surplus of labour
is going to be an increase in migration pressures. So there is a very intimate in-
terconnection between legal trade on the one hand and illegal trade on the other,
but of course there is a contradiction in the way that these elements or aspects
of the economy are regulated, a contradiction between the norm of liberalization
on the one hand and an increasing attention to criminalization on the other. The
criminalization of illegal products is a criminalization of illegal persons. This is a
very problematic dynamic. Criminalization does nothing to stop the ﬂow of illegal
products and services – if anything it makes the ﬂowmore lucrative by imposing a
blackmarket premium on these sectors. At the same time it provides a justiﬁcation
for repression, domination, and control of certain producers and certain persons
that itself tends to perpetuate global inequality.
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
DavidM. Trubek*
The topic ofmy talk is the changing relationship betweennational law, social rights,
and the international order. I shall focus on the protection of workers’ rights and
the promotion of labour standards, but the analysis can be applied more generally
to other social and economic rights. The traditional approach has been to employ
national law to protect workers’ rights and improve labour standards, through
labour law and collective bargaining. Both are normally regulated through national
laws.
While actual regulatory processes have always been carried out at the national
level or through private bargaining that is supervised and enforced by national
authorities, there is a long tradition of international action in the ﬁeld of workers’
rights and labour standards. Two moments deserve special note: the formation of
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the creation of the BrettonWoods
System in the aftermath of the SecondWorldWar.
* Professor of Law, Director, Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy, University of Wisconsin-
Madison.
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In both cases the primary focus of international activity was to buttress national
regulatory systems. The ILO sought to deﬁne workers’ rights with precision and to
create international labour standards. But the ILO system leaves the nation-states
with the primary, indeed almost the exclusive, responsibility for the protection
of these rights. Similarly, the postwar system of ‘embedded liberalism’ created by
Bretton Woods was explicitly designed to give nations leeway to develop strong
industrial relations systems andwelfare states. The BrettonWoods system said little
speciﬁcally about workers’ rights, but its architects thought that if the rules were
followed those nations wanting to protect such rights would not be undermined by
world economic pressures.
The result was a governance system which relied on national regulation but
ensured a supportive international environment for nations choosing to build
strong systems of industrial relations. In the twentieth century, the system, while
far from perfect, worked fairly well for some countries. It facilitated the creation
of effective unions, allowed nations to promote some degree of equality, and
made it possible to promote reasonable working conditions at least in the rich
countries of the North. While the system was much less effective in the devel-
oping world, it did have some effect even for poorer nations. And although the
system worked reasonably well in richer countries where support for worker’s
rights were strong, even in those countries rights were not always implemen-
ted effectively and international standards could easily be ignored. In recent
years the system has proved to be completely inadequate to the task at hand.
It no longer works that well in the North, and continues to be limited in the
South.
There isnoquestion that globalization is a factor in theunravellingof thepostwar
system, which in the last analysis relied on the capacity of the nation-state to
implementworkers’ rights. But globalization canweaken the regulatory capacity of
thenation-state. Because capital ismoremobile, countriesmayﬁnd it harder to raise
standardswhencompanies threaten tomove to locationswhere standards are lower.
For the same reason, it is harder to impose taxes needed to fund social protection
systems. The globalization of production creates new problems, since the ensuing
commodity chains cut across national borders.
The result may be a governance gap in which national law cannot be fully
effective and international action,whichwas designed solely to strengthennational
legal systems, is inadequate to ﬁll the resulting void. Globalization has undermined
manyof theprotections against global shocks thatwere set up in thepostwarperiod.
There is no international body with regulatory power capable of replacing national
law.
Whileforsomethesolutionistorollbackglobalization,mostrecognizethatthis is
unlikely to happen. Moreover, efforts to reduce international economic integration
in the name of social justice could harm the very interestswhose protection is being
sought. If globalization is to be compatible with the protection of workers’ rights,
somewaymust be found to ﬁll the governance gap. To do that, wemust forge a new
approach to global governance based on a new vision of the relationship between
national law and international regimes.
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It is easier, however, to see that anewapproach isneeded than to saywhat itmight
look like. And it is easier to see what will not work than to say what might prove
to be an effective strategy to ﬁll the gap I have described. One thing is relatively
clear: simple models, taken from the history of federal systems such as the United
States, are not the solution. TheUS solutionwas simple: wemoved the regulation of
legalmatters from the state to the federal level, creating an effective national labour
law.
Thismodel isnot available to theworld community, andwere it available, it could
well be undesirable. There is no institution at global level remotely qualiﬁed to take
this on. There is also reason to believe that any effort to create a comprehensive
global system ofmandatory labour norms enforced by a central organizationwould
be a bad idea even if it could be accomplished. Workers’ rights and the methods of
enforcing themaredeeply embedded innational systems, and there is great diversity
in thepathsnationshavechosenand the instruments theyhave selected todealwith
these issues. The changes in theworld brought about by globalizationhaveoccurred
so rapidly, and the situation remains so volatile, that it is hard to know what issues
should be addressed at global level. Because of the novelty of the issues, the diversity
of the institutions, and the volatility of the situation, we lack knowledge of how to
proceed.
Even at the regional level, there is no easy path to follow. The European Union
(EU) has evolved a very complex approach that eschews primary reliance on a
central legal code or regulatory body. EU rules deal only with a limited number of
areas: the freemovementofworkers, health and safety,workerparticipation, and job
discrimination. The rules are largely implemented through national statutes and
regulations and are enforced by national authorities. Many key areas of workers’
rights, including freedom of association, andmany dimensions of labour standards,
including remuneration, are left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU member
states.
ThemostrecentEUforayintothelabourareas iscalledtheEuropeanEmployment
Strategy or ‘EES’. This process, dubbed an ‘open method of co-ordination’, avoids
central legislation altogether. Instead, the EES seeks to identify a number of major
goals related to the elimination of unemployment which are shared by all the EU
countries, but leaves the choice of means and implementation to each state while
requiring that they exchange experiences and engage inmultilateral surveillance of
each other’s efforts. This system encourages each country to seek its own solution
in the light of everyone’s experience. A key feature of the EES system is the use of
guidelines, targets, indicators, and benchmarking.
Nevertheless, the EU system lacks a set of justiciable social rights at the European
level. There are two overlapping sets of social rights that affect the EU’s 15 member
states. Theﬁrst are theprovisions of theEuropeanSocialCharter, in force since 1965,
whichisadministeredbytheCouncilofEuropeandwhichcoversall theEUcountries
and other European countries as well. The second is the recently promulgated EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000). The Social Charter is enforced through a
system of reporting and monitoring. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has no
explicit enforcement mechanism.
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Summing up, the EU system encourages problem-solving through decentraliz-
ation and experimentation, but makes each country accountable to the others for
results. It also knits together all levels, from the supra-national to the local. It en-
gages private actors as well as governments, even to the degree of bringing unions
into the lawmaking process itself. The EU governance system does not rely exclus-
ively on legal regulations. Rather, it employs a wide variety of tools that include
not only formal legislation but also statements of principle, declarations of rights,
non-binding guidelines, common indicators, benchmarking, and multilateral sur-
veillance. The EUhas created amulti-level system that provides for decentralization
andﬂexibility but co-ordinates the activities of themember states and creates strong
pressures on all the states to seek the best path towards common goals.
What lessons can we take from the European system for a new international
architecture for social rights? Clearly, what works in Europe, with its long history
of workers’ rights at the national level, strong unions, dense systems of labourman-
agement, and democratic political systems, cannot automatically be transferred to
other parts of theworld. Further, noonewouldpretend that theEUsystem is perfect:
Thus, some think that the lack of justiciable social rights at the EU level is a serious
ﬂaw. Nonetheless, there are lessons to be learned that would apply to Latin America
and other parts of theworld. The European case clearly suggests that simplemodels,
drawn from domestic law or even from strong federal systems such as the United
States and Brazil, are not necessarily the only answer to the challenge. It shows us
that new forms of governance are available. The European case offers some con-
crete lessons. The creation of a uniﬁedmarket requires attention to social as well as
economic issues. Highly speciﬁc and uniform rules enforced by a strong central reg-
ulatory agency are inappropriate for the complex task of enforcing workers’ rights,
even at regional level. It is possible to combine decentralized experimentation and
national diversity with centralized monitoring, co-ordination, and collective pres-
sure for progressive change. Common indicators and benchmarking can play a role
in ensuring progress towards commonly accepted goals. Regional co-operation de-
mands the close integration of national and regional levels of government in the
evolutionof objectives, guidelines, targets, and actionplans. It is essential that social
partners and civil society participate at regional and national level in the develop-
ment of guidelines, assessment of performance, and pressure for improvement. I
believe these lessons will be of value for people in the Americas and other parts
of the world as they seek to develop an architecture for the protection of workers’
rights and other social rights in the face of globalization.
GROUP I DISCUSSION
Erwin Lanc. I refer to Specht’s last sentences and I quote: ‘An institutional frame-
work for thealternativeprogrammeofglobalizationmustbe “functionallyagnostic”
with respect to the particular features of varying social and economic programmes
(policies). It should allow for thepromotionof different anddistinctiveprogrammes
and for a continuous assessment of each programme. Crucially, an institutional
framework developed as part of such an alternative must be agnostic with respect
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to the particular institutions which constitute the framework itself.’ My question
is: how should this gathering function?Will it be a meeting of the powerless to get
power – how do you think about that?
Norman Birnbaum. I have a question: to what extent is the entire working pop-
ulation or very nearly the entire working population of the northern hemisphere,
of the advanced capitalist countries with their higher standards of living, a kind of
global labour aristocracy, whose interests through political as well as ideological,
economic,andculturaldevelopmentsaremoreanchoredtotheinterestsof theirown
property-owning andmanagerial elites than to some abstract notion of solidarity? I
know that is contradicted by the ideology and by the political behaviour of some of
theWestern trade unions. John Sweeny, the president of the American Trade Union
Confederation, AFL-CIO, was at both Seattle and Genoa. Nonetheless, the problems
of mobilization at the base and of international solidarity remain and are problems
worthy of our attention because they do deal with the political potential of any
movement of this kind.
Manfred Rotter. Maybe we would gain in clarity if we distinguished between sov-
ereignty as a legal term and autonomy as a social scientiﬁc term. I think dealing
with the actual capacity of a state or a government, asMs Thomas said, is one thing,
and quite another is dealing with sovereignty as one of the component elements
of the international legal system. That brings me to Ms Kapur. If I got you right, it
was your thesis to say thatwe should somehow change the concept of international
borders. Very well: but we should keep in mind that borders do not only have the
function attributed to them in international law, of being the membrane, distin-
guishing between the public power of two states, to separate the public authority
of two states; borders also entail a social and an economic dimension and it is the
borders that limit the territorial dimension of the redistribution of wealth. So the
point is: if we jeopardize the function of borders in the economic sense of the word
we will have problems. Weakening the economic power of the ‘haves’ cannot be
the real aim of enhancing the possibilities of the ‘have-nots’, if I may say so. This is
to say that the formal system also provides security to the have-nots. The so-called
Lotus principle is also a protection for the weaker. This is an aspect that we should
not forget.
Max Schmidt. I have also questions to Dr Specht and Professor Thomas. The ﬁrst
is: what is your opinion about the future role of the economic and social task of
the United Nations? Do you see any future in this direction? And more in detail:
what do you think about the role of the Economic and Social Council as a forum for
developing countries to play a more efﬁcient role?
Gu¨nter Frankenberg. As I am not an international law scholar I prefer to step
back from the current debate. My observation: there seem to be two dominant
models of the relationship between international law and politics, which were
both represented today. The ﬁrst is based on the assumption that politics dominate
law, which has a renaissance in the post-11 September United States. The second
model invokes the genius loci, Hans Kelsen, and holds that law dominates politics.
I interpret Professor Rotter in this sense – if I have misunderstood him, I hope it
is a creative misunderstanding. I understood the papers this morning to say that
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they tried to come to grips with a third model which would be characterized by
an uneasy relationship between law and politics of reciprocal control. I think the
legal dominationmodel seems to be in trouble because of a reinvention of imperial
laws as politics. First, it has grown to be strictly hegemonic – not only recently –
and it is unilaterally dominated by empire number one, the United States. It seems
to be guided by the imperative of security to an extent that all other normative
concerns, which would have to be included to make it at least acceptable to a
broader community of nations, have been relativized, if not extinguished. Today
the system of concepts seems to be in disarray. We no longer have to deal with a
couple of principles we can easily order in a hierarchical fashion or balance certain
factors to reach results that couldmake us happy or not. I heard you talk about legal
hybridity, which seems to be a ﬁttingmetaphor. This uneasy coexistence of law and
politics seems to be more promising than any of the other models.
Friedrich Kratochwil. I wonderwhether not the liberal project per se, but rather the
limits of the liberal project have come to the fore in these discussions. For example:
the paper on migration seems to suggest that the greatest possible freedom for the
individual – which is only now extended from males to females – is progressive.
Although I am very sympathetic to arguments attacking the paternalistic state
and its alleged protective function, which is mostly used to keep others ‘out’, the
espoused position does not seem to consider all the social ramiﬁcations of such
a policy, which consists of the absolute subordination of questions of the social
order to questions of individual preference. Similarly, Professor Thomas talks about
the paradox or the contradiction of liberalization and what she calls an increasing
‘regime of prohibition’. It is a paradox only on the most superﬁcial level, because
everybody knows that the more you liberalize something the more you have to
regulate that area, or youare likely tohave social consequenceswhicharedisastrous.
For example, Latin American states had to ﬁnd out that you needed a very strong
state in order to liberalize themarket. Finally, Dr Specht’s argument has particularly
emphasized a point made by Mr Lanc’s reading of the crucial passage. It reinforces
Mr Rajagopal’s argument which to me sounded a bit like the claim of the primacy
of the right over that of the good. But such a stance raises exactly and perhaps most
sharply thequestionof the limitsof the liberalproject.While itmightbeprudentnot
to have toomuch packed into a proposal when one engages with other people with
other political projects, the primacy of the right over the good, and the necessary
agnosticism as to ultimate goals that go with this position, it is nevertheless a
substantive political ideal, identiﬁed with the liberal project, not simply a neutral
procedural yardstick. I might not have anything against this particular project, I
might even adhere to it, but it needs further justiﬁcation.
Thomas. I am happy to go ﬁrst. On the paradoxical relationship between liberal-
ization and prohibitionism, we must look at the way in which the state is involved
in enabling or legalizing trade and compare that to the way in which the state is
involved in criminalizing. The state is involved on both sides, and I do not suggest
that the state was withdrawing from the process of liberalization. Rather, I think
it is important to focus on the differences between the kind of state intervention
that one sees within the project of liberalization and the kind of state intervention
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that one sees within the project of prohibitionism. Professor Kapur identiﬁed mi-
gration as integral to international trade and yet at the same time it is portrayed as
a problem that is separate and apart from the global economy. And yet if we look at
it analytically, the impulses that lead to migration are part of the dynamics of the
global economy.
Kapur. I want to proceed from what Professor Thomas has said. As to the idea
that it is for the protection of the ‘have nots’, if that were the case, it should then
lead to other initiatives that states could adopt, such as decriminalizing sex work or
providing rights and beneﬁts tomigrants andmigrantworkers’ families or ratifying
a convention on migrant workers’ families as well. But clearly that is not the case.
Instead, they criminalize or victimize the migrant. I want to reiterate what Pro-
fessor Frankenberg said, that the big challenges now are how to accommodate these
transnational movements and this transnational phenomenon without resorting
to the rigid notions of borders and nation-states, or protecting some nation-states’
borders while in fact aggravating problems relating to the borders of other nation-
states.
Specht. I would not talk about autonomy, but about sovereignty.We are now able
to witness an attack on the sovereignty of one state and the attitude of an alliance
brought about by this attack, which leads to a broad intrusion by this one state for
reasons other than the protection of sovereignty. I am sure that our Russian friends
here can tell us a lot about the oil routes around Russia or through Russia, andwhat
difference it makes that US troops or the so-called allied troops of the International
Community are now legally authorized to operate out of Uzbekistan. Look at the
IMForWorldBankconditionalities for loansor interventionsand then try toexplain
to me again the difference between autonomy and sovereignty.
Of course, it is very ambitious to think of a ‘new’ Bretton Woods, but I would
be content merely with some steps in this direction. Some examples: ﬁrst comes
a change of discourse. As a practical lawyer I can tell you that in many parts of
the world ‘corporation’ means ‘US corporation’ and if you want to explain that
there are other legal orders which have developed much earlier than the US idea of
corporation then you are not going to be heard. Or take barter, a signiﬁcant aspect
of trade between the less developed countries (LDCs). It is presented to us as only
a problem resulting from the inefﬁciency of state-owned enterprises. I think this is
laughable. But this power to interpret reality hadhugebearings on theway inwhich
international institutions have behaved and dealt with the needs of developing –
whatever this means – social and economic realities in parts of the world.
Deborah Cass. Dr Specht, how different are the outcomes of an ‘unruly pluralism’
or a ‘newparadigm’ andourmore familiar regimes? In the trade system, some liberal
theorists relyonconceptswhichcouldbeseenasbeingveryopen– forexample, John
Jackson has spoken about trade operating as an ‘interface’. It is a very functionally
agnostic concept. Jackson describes it asmaking aworld open to diverse values both
political and cultural. Other writers, Francis Schneider or Teubner, for example,
promote a global liberal pluralism. So there are lots of routes towards something
that seems to be alternative. Sure, stand up and say that the conventional routes do
not really wantmore openness. Your particular routemay end up in the same place.
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I mean, it is not as if a conventional liberal author gets up every morning and says,
we want to restrict economic possibilities only to the First World. They genuinely
believe that an open interface trading systemwould create opportunities for others.
I have great sympathy with wanting to recognize different forms and contents of
social organization, and I think that is true of most people around the table, but we
may need to be able to work out how that differs from existing mechanisms.
David Kennedy. This panel puts us in front of a difﬁcult question. There is a
conventional European social democratic response to the problemsof unilateralism
in politics and neo-liberal globalization and economics. It is a familiar and well-
trodden response, with a deep history. All of the papers from the panel thismorning
seem tome to be askingwhether that response is enough andwhether that response
is even a good idea.
TheconventionalEuropean social democratic response in thedomainof econom-
ics arises out of a social tradition. It advocates a chastening of neo-liberalism, which
would harness it to human rights and be attentive tomarket failures, which serve as
justiﬁcations for intervention by some state apparatus. The conventional response
by social democrats inEurope accepts the efﬁciency frame for the economic analysis
of policy, but supposes that market failures are more common than others suspect,
so that the opportunities for intervention aremore numerous. There is no attention
to the multiple possible efﬁcient markets, or to their quite different distributional
effects – nor is there much attention to mobilizing resources for growth and devel-
opment. In the domain of politics the conventional social democratic response to
the problems of unilateralism are multilateral legal institutions and a rejuvenated
global civil society. Both are seen as responses to the loss of political capacities in
nation-states, but neither is imagined as the site of an engaged or vibrant politics
which could challenge existing institutional arrangements in any signiﬁcant way.
They are sites for symbolic acts of humanization and complaint against the existing
arrangements, but not for their contestation. And in the domain of law, the conven-
tionalEuropeansocialdemocratic response tounilateralismhasbeenan invigorated
attention to human rights and humanitarianism. Each of these traditional sources
of energy for the left was drawn into question by the papers on the panel. Yet each
one of the papers also drew on those traditions in trying to develop an alternative. I
want to try to sharpenour discussion of the limits of this traditional European social
democratic alternative and how it is that we want to resurrect pieces of it.
Professor Kapur’s paper suggested that the anti-trafﬁcking movement, which is
conventionally understood as the humane and left position, has tried to strengthen
international human rights norms to protect the position of women. But migrants
encounter new difﬁculties as a result. Professor Kapur emphasized that this effort
to humanize the international migration system is not enough, but is rather part
of the problem. This is a challenging argument, and I think it is not surprising
that we keep coming back to that example and asking for more clariﬁcation. It
picks up on something Professor Thomas said in identifying the unacknowledged
repressive corollary to traditional social democratic ideas. The development of a
labour aristocracy, identiﬁed by Professor Birnbaumwith efforts to solidify borders
and to create a repressive apparatus to maintain them, or in Professor Thomas’s
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terms with the effort to demonize certain forms of trade as the sorry underbelly of
the liberalization effort – these were parallel examples of a traditional European
social democratic response to globalization run amok. It also struckme in Professor
Rajagopal’s presentationon economic and social rights that this has been theUnited
Nations’majorresponsetoglobalizationaswell.As IunderstoodProfessorRajagopal,
not only are they not enough, but as they are being applied they are part of the
problem, not part of the solution.He emphasized quite clearly that human rights are
not sufﬁcient tochasteneconomicglobalization, andweonthe left should refuse the
temptation to place our hopes there. We should also refuse to conﬁne our interests
indistributionwithin the current vocabularyof development – and inparticular the
subset of that vocabulary associated with economic and social rights. Doing so, if I
read Professor Rajagopal correctly, would be to overlook opportunities to humanize
the market itself in its fundamental institutions.
Taken together, thesepapers seem tome topresent an extremely strong challenge
to conventional European social democratic thinking about globalization, both
economically and politically. I would like to ask the group what we think about
that. Let us assume for a moment that we agree with the paper presenters that the
traditional European social democratic response is part of theproblem.Weare in the
very depressing situation that there is no existing alternative on the table. Each of
the papers seemed quite angry at the European social democratic response. But I did
not read any as having a strong other road, other than some pieces of the traditional
programme which might be lifted up in a new constellation. Professor Trubek
suggests: let us lift up the idea of civil society and advocacy groups and promote it in
some stronger way, but then it seems that the question is: what stronger way? And a
question for you,DavidTrubek,might be: let us take theTobin tax, couldwe imagine
the Tobin tax implemented by cities, by towns, and by professional associations?
Is there any way to imagine slowing the gears of capital ﬂight other than through
Malaysian-style national regulation? How do we imagine lifting up this element of
civil society and giving it a stronger relevance?
Another idea which I read from both Professor Thomas and Professor Kapur,
would be to embrace aspects of the market. If I really understood you, I heard you
to be saying legalize drugs and sex trafﬁcking. A regulated market would be a more
humane response than criminalization. How should the left think about situations
inwhichwewouldwant to embrace some forms of a regulatedmarket and lift them
up in particular contexts as the less repressive alternative? It is an interesting idea.
I think the question for you both would be: when? In the narrow area of trafﬁcking
I can understand that this might provide us with something, because it attacks so
strongly the idea of borders and it has a role in opening up the broader problem of
migration on analogy to the free ﬂow of capital. This seems to have some analytic
appeal, so maybe there is a way in which we could generalize from the instance of
trafﬁcking to identify other places where a regulated market idea can be lifted up
and be part of our post-European social democratic alternative.
The third proposal I heard was exactly the one Professor Cass mentioned: hybrid
organizations and constitutional ﬂuidity, let us raise them up, and rethink the
institutional backdrop for global commerce. So the challenge here would be to say:
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if ﬂexibility about institutional form is going to be part of our new left agenda,
can we identify particular sorts of cases in which particular kinds of alternative
corporate formsoralternative transactional formsmightbemorepartof thesolution
than part of the problem? I guess that for me the overall problem we are faced
with over these two days is: what do we do with our disappointment about the
conventionalEuropeansocialdemocraticresponsetounilateralism?AsanAmerican
who feels inonewayor another involved in aproject of critiqueofmyowncountry’s
unilateralism, I would like to believe that I could reach out to a stronger alliance
with the European social democratic tradition. Yet I share a lot of the doubts that
were expressed by the panel, and I share the feeling that we are only at the very
beginning of ﬁguring out which pieces of that can be effectively put back on the
table.
Rotter. Somehow it seems to boil down to the question of revolution or evolu-
tion. The narrowest deﬁnition of revolution as we may know is the break-up of
the existing constitution of order, be it on a states level or be it on the level of in-
ternational systems. The point I was trying to make is that the international legal
system is under attack from both sides. Say, for example, that the Unites States puts
forward the proposition that the traditional notion of Article 55 of United Nations
Charter (self-defence) is outdated, thatweno longer need self-defence in the sense of
Article 51:whatweneed is pre-emptive self-defence.Noweveryonedealingwith law
knows that there cannot be a model of pre-emptive self-defence in a legal system.
That is the end of any legal system.
Youallknowthe riot theUnitesStateshas createdover the InternationalCriminal
Court – without any need, becausemy colleagues inWashington need only to have
looked into the statute of the International Criminal Court. If you read it, and you
do not have to do so particularly carefully, you will ﬁnd that the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court is onlymeant to be subsidiary to national jurisdiction.
Thus if theUnited Stateswere to say that it doesnotwant the InternationalCriminal
Court to have jurisdiction over US personnel working outside the United States, we
do it onour own, the casewouldnot have arisen.And ifwe look at the legal situation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina we know that the United Nations including the US
personnel working in Bosnia is completely exempt from Bosnian jurisdiction. The
point is that we witness states, the United States, but not alone, that try to get rid of
legal arguments without trying to explain what are they really up to. They simply
said that is our caseandeveryone that is able touse the Internet couldhave foundout
within a couple of minutes that the position was absolutely ridiculous. But what is
behind? Behind is the attack on the international system as such and thus attacking
the basis of construing new policies. What I mean, Mr Frankenberg, is, take the
international law as it is. So to say: the instruments are here, the instruments are at
our hands.
Trubek. In response to Prof. Cass: you asked how different would it be to the
present situation. Not so different, but very different. Not so different in that there is
a reality of pluralism, but a unity of discourse in authoritative circles, and that dis-
course reinforces and is reinforced by real institutional actions, barriers, allocation
of resources, rules and so on. So while there is a discourse that seems on the surface
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to favour pluralism and there is a reality of pluralism in part because no discourse
and no hegemonic system is truly all encompassing, there is a tilt in a certain direc-
tion that comes from a vision which while promising a diversity actually leads to
uniformity. I think there are two dichotomies on the table that Iwanted to question.
Onewas revolution versus reform, a distinction that seems tomeno longer ofmuch
value, everything is sort of in themiddle. Professor Frankenberg’s idea, it is not only
law with no politics or politics with no law, but some complicated mixture of law
and politics. You do not pretend that law alone is all-powerful; you do not pretend
that law ismeaningless andyoumove ahead. So get past those twodichotomies, that
is, between law and politics as separate spheres, get past reform versus revolution,
pick of the shards of the past and try to make it into a vision for the future.
Susan Marks. I would like to take up Professor Kennedy’s question: what do
we do with our disappointment about the social democratic project? It made me
think of something a British Marxist theorist, Terry Eagleton, once wrote about the
position of Marxists generally. He said, rather than turning their backs on the great
modern ideals of freedom and equality, Marxists should adopt the position of the
‘faux naı¨f’, and ask why it is that those ideals never seem to enter upon material
reality. In other words, they should insist that the ideals be made more real than
current understandings or conceptualizations allow. The reason I mention this is
that what I heard from these wonderful presentations we had earlier this morning
was that current understandings of the social democratic project do not have to
exhaust our understanding of what that project has to offer. It contains untapped
emancipatory potential, as the history of struggles in the political arena and in law
indeed conﬁrms. Feminists, for example, did not throw out the idea of equality; they
did not say ‘we should not be reposing our hopes in that concept’. Instead, they
worked to reappropriate the concept for emancipatory ends. They made it mean
more than people had hitherto wanted it to mean; they exposed the limitations
of earlier understandings. This is another way of putting Professor Trubek’s point:
what we dowith our disappointment is that we try to recuperate the shards of what
is already there.
Frankenberg. I want to enrich David’s question: what can be salvaged from this
social democratic vision in the centre? We have to make an assessment of who is
being excluded by new transnational treaty regimes such as the WTO and others,
and afterwehavemade this assessmentwemay then address his question as towhat
part of the centre may be helpful and not just create new problems. To me, it seems
that we have a signiﬁcant shift in international law from the instrumental to the
symbolic, in so far as many conventions originally designed to help victims, even
prevent victimization, now just have a symbolicmeaning – theymake you feel good
but they don’t do anything good. That is why I am not comfortable with the idea
that we should just progress on this middle road hoping that this might be better
than nothing. I think that we really have also to rethink this middle road.
JoelPaul.Thethemeofsocial justicehasquicklybeentransformedintoadiscussion
about the disparity of state power and institutional capacity. I think that it is inter-
esting that there has been as much discussion about internal social justice issues.
The senseof victimization fromglobalization is common toall states – including the
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 871
hegemonic power. In the United States we do not perceive that we are in charge of
globalization. We feel ourselves disempowered by the process of globalization and
the need of some who compete more effectively with imports from south-east Asia
andwe feel pressured by the competitive forces that the EuropeanUnion represents.
So there is the senseof statesnotbeing in control.Whenwe talk about liberalization,
there are two aspects to it: there is a liberalization of trade – opening our borders
to certain goods and services capital, which of course implies the immobility of
labour and the problems that come from that – but also there is the idea of trade
liberalization being paralleled with the notion of liberalizing internal regulation –
having ﬂat taxes, moving away from redistribution efforts. So the argument made
by economists that trade, for example, expands the pie for everybody, is in fact not
true, but becausewe know that that is part of the liberalization effort to expand that
pie,we also undertake efforts tomake sure that the pie does not get distributed at all.
There is thereforeaway inwhich that liberalization isdefeating itsown justiﬁcation.
And I think somehow that the way out of this trap of liberalization comes with the
notion of wanting to reconceptualize liberalization, so that it is understood not as
something that happens to us out there, something external to us, but as something
embedded in the state itself. That is to see globalization not as external force, not to
see us as a victim of globalization, but to see us as an instrument of globalization, as
something that we undertake to do. And liberalization is as much a policy, as much
an act of state regulation, as is any other form of economic regulation. It is a choice
wemake and howwe shape that choice is up to us.
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